Jorge Rangel

the Harvard-educated L.A. City Attorney, Rocky Delgadillo, who is best known for prosecuting famed Paris Hilton and publicly admitting that he misuse

2008-03-20T01:57:00.000-07:00

The 10 WORST U.S. Prosecutors Named: Texas Leads List with Four

United States Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, was selected as the worst prosecutor out of 10 in the nation in 2007 for his involvement in the firings of nine U.S. Attorneys and the politicization of the Justice Department. At a close second, Texas ex-prosecutor Terry D. McEachern, who is best known for seeking unlawful cocaine possession charges against the African-American community of Tulia, Texas, and withholding exculpatory evidence. Next selected, former North Carolina D.A. Michael Nifong, for the widely-publicized debacle in the rape prosecution of Duke Lacrosse players causing his disbarment for having engaged in dishonesty, fraud, and withholding exculpatory information.

While a prosecutor’s job is to seek justice, there have been numerous instances in U.S history where federal and state prosecutors have engaged in unethical conduct simply to secure a conviction where otherwise not possible if they had played “by the rules.” The “Ten Worst Prosecutors” list carefully researched and produced by the Bennett Law Firm (BLF) in Houston, Texas, features a handful of recent occurrences where federal and state prosecutors did not play “by the rules” with respect to evidence in criminal trials and ruined the lives of innocent people to further their own professional careers.

The BLF and the “Bad Prosecutor Blog” website (visit: http://bennettlawfirm. typepad.com/badprosecutors) chose to recognize the ten worst prosecutors in the United States in 2007 to bring about an open discussion of prevalent prosecutorial misconduct, and most importantly, to stress the importance of holding bad prosecutors accountable for their unlawful indiscretions. For over thirty years, the BLF has been involved in criminal, civil, and administrative investigation. BLF Attorney Robert S. “Bob” Bennett, a former federal prosecutor, has been qualified as an expert on prosecutorial abuse and prosecutorial recusal. Mr. Bennett has also published numerous articles and has given countless speeches on these topics.

Prosecutorial misconduct ranges from hiding, destroying, or tampering with evidence, case files or court records; failing to disclose exculpatory evidence; using false or misleading evidence during trial; to improper behavior during grand jury proceedings. The BLF’s “Ten Worst” list exposes the harsh reality that bad prosecutors are not always disciplined for such misconduct and, in most cases, continue practicing law without missing a beat. The BLF and the website strongly believe that the list will heighten public awareness and, in turn, help curb unjust prosecutions and deter future prosecutorial misconduct.

Other bad prosecutors selected for the BLF “Ten Worst” list include the likes of Louisiana Attorney General Charles Foti, Jr., Massachusetts Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Auerhahn, Georgia Prosecutor David McDade, Oklahoma D.A. Bill Peterson, L.A. City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo, and Texas licensed attorneys: Charles Sebesta and Randall W. Reynolds.

Foti’s persistence in attempting to prosecute a doctor and two nurses after hurricane Katrina and making extrajudicial statements surrounding their guilt have secured him a spot on the BLF’s “Ten Worst” list. Auerhahn’s blatant disregard for the constitutional rights of an innocent man which resulted in a 22 year sentence and 13 years behind bars before it was ever discovered has earned him a listing as well. McDade was selected for overzealously prosecuting a 17-year-old over oral sex with a consenting 15-year-old girl under an archaic loophole in Georgia law (which has now been abolished) and for distributing a video of the sexual encounter in violation of federal child pornography laws.

Texas prosecutor, Charles Sebesta, makes an appearance on the list for presenting false, misleading evidence and not disclosing an exculpatory confession during the murder prosecution of Anthony Graves which resulted in his conviction and being sent to death row for capital murder in 1994. Ward County D.A, Randall W. Reynolds, was selected for dragging his feet in response to reliable allegations of sexual abuse of inmates at the West Texas State School in Pyote, Texas, and delaying the prosecution of two accused prison guards for more than 2 years.

Also selected was prosecutor Bill Peterson for inspiring John Grisham to write a novel about his vigorous yet erroneous prosecution and conviction of Ron Williamson for capital murder in 1988 on weak physical evidence and jailhouse informants. Last, but certainly not least, the list includes the Harvard-educated L.A. City Attorney, Rocky Delgadillo, who is best known for prosecuting famed Paris Hilton and publicly admitting that he misused public resources by negligently allowing his accident-prone wife to use a city vehicle for personal errands resulting $1,200 of damage and then letting taxpayers foot the bill, all the while complaining about a two-tiered judicial system that gives “special treatment” to the privileged.

If you would like to obtain a copy of the BLF’s “Ten Worst Prosecutors” Article, please visit http://bennettlawfirm.typepad.com/badprosecutors or contact Scott Chauveaux at 713-225-6000; e-mail Schauveaux@bennettlawfirm.com. To contact BLF Attorney Bob Bennett, visit: www.bennettlawfirm.com or email Bbennett@bennettlawfirm.com.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MARK ALBERT MALOOF,

Defendant.
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Criminal No.: H-97-93

Violations:

15 U.S.C. §1
18 U.S.C. § 371
FILED 6/23/97

UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT FOR PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

The United States of America, through its undersigned attorney, hereby responds to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Proceedings ("Defendant's Motion"). In his Motion, the defendant alleges a "pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct prejudicing the Defendant in underlying grand jury proceedings." Def. Mot. at 1. Specifically, he claims that:

1. government attorneys had a conflict of interest in conducting the grand jury investigation;

2. government attorneys conducted abusive and misleading questioning of witnesses before the grand jury; and,

3. government attorneys and agents interfered with defense counsel's access to a government witness.

Defendant's Motion lacks merit. First, defendant fails to demonstrate a pattern of government misconduct. In fact, the conduct of government attorneys has been at all times ethical and appropriate. Secondly, defendant has failed to show he has been prejudiced in any way. Therefore, dismissal of the Indictment is inappropriate and unwarranted, and defendant's Motion should be denied.

DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT IS AN EXTREME REMEDY WHICH REQUIRES A
FINDING OF ACTUAL PREJUDICE

As a sanction for alleged misconduct, the standard for dismissal of an indictment is extremely high. The Supreme Court held that a district court may not exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct in such a way that by-passes the harmless error rule of Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369 (1988). Thus, dismissal is appropriate only "'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict' or if there is ‘grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from substantial influence of such violations." Id. at 256, 108 S.Ct. at 2374, quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78, 106 S.Ct. 938, 946 (1986). A district court has "no authority to dismiss an indictment on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct absent a finding that petitioners were prejudiced by such misconduct." Id. at 263, 108 S.Ct. at 2378. See also United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992) (further restricting supervisory power of a court to its own procedures).

Because dismissal of an indictment is an extreme remedy, a defendant seeking a dismissal on either constitutional or ethical grounds must prove actual prejudice. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-66, 101 S.Ct. 665, reh. denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981); Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 255, 108 S.Ct. at 2374. See also United States v. Weeks, 919 F.2d 248, 254 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 954 (1991) ; United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976). There is a strong presumption of regularity surrounding a grand jury proceeding. United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982). Prosecutorial misconduct, no matter how egregious, does not provide grounds for dismissing an indictment without a showing of actual prejudice. United States v. Merlino, 595 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).

As evidenced in the above-cited cases, courts have routinely refused to dismiss indictments for want of actual prejudice. The United States Supreme Court in the Morrison case articulated the public interest underlying this policy:

So drastic a step [as dismissal] might advance marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the guilty brought to book.

449 U.S. at 366 n.3; 101 S.Ct. 668 n.3, quoting United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 1419 (1966).

DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT NOR
SHOWN ACTUAL PREJUDICE AND THEREFORE DISMISSAL OF THE
INDICTMENT IS UNWARRANTED

On June 21, 1995, FBI agents met with defendant and sought his cooperation in the price-fixing investigation of the metal building insulation industry. On this day, government attorneys also met briefly with defendant to offer him immunity in exchange for his cooperation, which he declined. Defendant claims that the failure of the government attorneys to later withdraw from the grand jury investigation prejudiced him. He asserts that "personal involvement . . . destroyed" the ability of government attorneys to evaluate evidence objectively. Def. Mot. at 7. The government attorneys in this case had no "personal involvement" in any of the events forming the basis of the charges against the defendant. Defendant's assertion that the objectivity of government attorneys was affected by meeting with him relies solely on actions taken by the government attorneys while performing their normal, every day, investigative duties as prosecutors. In any event, the Indictment of defendant was not returned by the government attorneys, but by the defendant's peers and fellow citizens, the grand jurors.

Defendant asserts that because of "personal involvement", government attorneys will be trial witnesses. However, the government attorneys in this case are not witnesses because the defendant has not shown a compelling need for their testimony. See United States v. Brothers, 856 F.Supp. 388 (M.D.Tenn. 1992). See also United States' Response to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Prosecutors Mark R. Rosman and Karen J. Sharp. While defendant provides his version of events leading up to his meeting with government attorneys, none of these events, nor the meeting itself with government attorneys, has any relevance to the grand jury proceedings and the resulting indictment brought against him.1 He fails to make a connection between the meeting and the grand jury proceedings leading to the Indictment, and thus fails to show how, if at all, he was prejudiced.

Defendant also claims that the government attorneys did not inform the grand jury that defendant declined the offer of immunity made to him. Defendant asserts his refusal to cooperate with the investigation is somehow exculpatory. The fact he declined the offered immunity is ambiguous at best. He could have chosen not to accept it for any number of reasons, most of which are not exculpatory. In any event, defendant purely speculates as to what grand jurors were told or not told about the case. In fact, the grand jury was aware that immunity was offered to defendant and that he declined to accept it. Thus, defendant has suffered no prejudice.

Defendant claims next that "abusive and misleading" questioning of several witnesses "biased and deceived" the grand jury. Def. Mot. at 8. He concludes that the prosecutors "broadcast" to grand jurors their personal opinions of the credibility of witnesses, and that repetitive questions were designed to communicate an erroneous proposition of law, thus somehow deceiving grand jurors regarding the applicable law. Id. These conclusions are without support as well.

The evidence submitted by defendant fails to support allegations that the government attorneys repeatedly "denigrated" witnesses, or that grand jurors were much more likely to discredit the testimony of such witnesses. Id. at 9. Defendant's affidavits from his co-workers do not come close to supporting such bald assertions. The affidavits of Byrd, Gilchrest, Hren, Nabors, and Watson merely say that each was questioned "several times" on a subject. The affidavit of Nancy Jensen says nothing about being questioned in the grand jury. Mark Novak is the only witness who claims to have been "upset" by the undersigned attorney "yelling" at him. The government questioned Mr. Novak in a proper and appropriate manner. As was stated to Mr. Novak's attorney on April 3, 1996, the government has an obligation to get straight answers from non-responsive, evasive witnesses for the record and for the benefit of the grand jurors. If the Court desires, the government will make a transcript of Mr. Novak's testimony, or that of any other witness, available for in camera inspection to prove that the witness was not subject to abusive questioning and that defendant was not prejudiced.

Significantly, neither Mr. Novak nor any other witness has claimed that they were intimidated into testifying falsely on any question, so again the defendant has not shown prejudice resulting from such alleged conduct.

There is simply no evidence that prosecutors "broadcast" their personal opinions which allegedly biased jurors. Likewise, there is no evidence that the grand jurors were erroneously instructed on applicable laws. In short, defendant again relies on conclusory and speculative allegations of misconduct to support his Motion. The strong presumption of regularity in grand jury proceedings cannot be outweighed by conclusory or speculative allegations of misconduct. U.S. v. Morgan, 845 F.Supp. 934, 941 (D.Conn. 1994), citing United States v. Abcasis, 785 F.Supp. 1113, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Because defendant relies on conclusions without supporting facts, he has not shown a substantial likelihood of influence or actual prejudice. There is no evidence that he suffered any prejudice at all, much less the evidence needed to meet the high standard that grand jurors were "substantially influenced" by such conduct. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. at 2334.

In his last argument, defendant claims that the prosecution made efforts to preclude his attorneys from gaining access to a government witness, Janne Smith. As seen in the accompanying Affidavit of Special Agent Frank Eldredge, the government made no efforts to prevent Ms. Smith from meeting with or disclosing her cooperation to defense,counsel. Eldredge Aff. at 1-2. Moreover, defendant fails to mention several important facts. First, Ms. Smith has been represented by independent counsel since June 1995. Id. at 2. Presumably, she has been following and acting on the advice of her counsel in deciding whom she would talk to about her knowledge of events and cooperation with the grand jury investigation. If defendant's attorneys wanted to speak with Ms. Smith, they could have contacted her counsel. This fact negates defendant's assertion that her testimony was in some way influenced by the government.

Another important fact not mentioned by defendant is that Ms. Smith actually met with counsel for Bay Insulation, Keith Rounsaville, and was questioned at length about her knowledge of defendant's activities and her cooperation with the grand jury investigation. Id. at 2. The government believes that defendant's attorneys are party to a joint defense agreement with other targets of the grand jury investigation, and their respective counsel, including defendant's employer, Bay Insulation Supply Co., and corporate counsel, Mr. Rounsaville. Thus, there is every likelihood that Mr. Rounsaville shared the notes and/or content of his lengthy debriefing of Ms. Smith with defendant's attorneys, as well as with the attorneys for other targets of the grand jury investigation. Indeed, during a pre-indictment meeting with government counsel, defendant's attorneys represented that they had already learned what Ms. Smith had to say. To date, the government has witnessed much evidence of the sharing of information between the defendant's attorneys and his employer's attorneys. See Attached letter, dated April 10, 1997 (indicating Bay counsel has seen government correspondence sent to defendant's attorney.) See also Affidavits of Mark Novak and Keith Rounsaville, attached to Def. Mot. to Preserve Grand Jury Tapes. (Mr. Rounsaville represented Mr. Novak at the grand jury.). Defendant's argument that he had no access to Ms. Smith is insincere at best. At a minimum, he has had indirect access to her information, and has suffered no prejudice at all.

CONCLUSION

Defendant has failed to demonstrate any government misconduct that would justify exercise of the Court's supervisory authority, or that he has suffered any actual prejudice. The conduct of the government attorneys has been at all times ethical and appropriate. Accordingly, dismissal of the Indictment is unwarranted in this case, and his Motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

______________/s/________________
MARK R. ROSMAN
Attorney-in-Charge
Florida State Bar No. 0964387
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
1601 Elm Street, Suite 4950
Dallas, Texas 75201-4717
(214) 880-9401

FOOTNOTES

1 The government strongly disputes defendant's description of the events of June 21, 1995. See Attached letters, dated August 12 and September 5, 1997.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the United States' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Proceedings was sent via Federal Express this ______ day of June, 1997, to:

J. Mark White, Esq.
White, Dunn & Booker
1200 First Alabama Bank Building
Birmingham, AL 32503

Albert C. Bowen, Esq.
Beddow, Erben & Bowen, P.A
Second Floor - 2019 Building
2019 3rd Avenue, North
Birmingham, AL 35203

_______________/s/________________
MARK R. ROSMAN
Attorney-in-Charge
Florida State Bar No. 0964387
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
1601 Elm Street, Suite 4950
Dallas, Texas 75201-4717
(214) 880-9401

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MARK ALBERT MALOOF,

Defendant.
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Criminal No.: H-97-93

Violations:

15 U.S.C. §1
18 U.S.C. § 371

ORDER

Upon consideration of the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Proceedings,

The Defendant's Motion is hereby DENIED.

DONE AND ENTERED THIS ________ day of _________ , 1997.

____________________________
United States District Judge

In applying the "essence" test, an arbitration award "must have a basis that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn,

2008-01-19T06:15:00.000-08:00

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NUMBER 13-06-023-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

CITY OF WESLACO, TEXAS, Appellant,

v.

BAUDELIO CASTILLO, ET AL., Appellees.

On appeal from the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

Appellant, the City of Weslaco, Texas ("the City"), appeals from the confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of appellees, Baudelio Castillo, David Gamez, Jose Angel Rodriguez, Brent Kennedy, and Adan Sanchez. (1) In two issues, the City contends the trial court erred in (1) confirming the award because the arbitration panel exceeded its authority under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), and (2) awarding attorneys' fees to appellees. We modify the judgment and, as modified, affirm.

Background

In 1998, appellees presented numerous complaints to the City regarding alleged acts of harassment, official oppression, retaliation and discrimination against them by then-Police Chief, J. D. Martinez, and other senior police department personnel. Appellees alleged that certain actions taken against them by Chief Martinez and others were in violation of the CBA between the parties. (2) On February 25, 1999, the parties signed an agreement to arbitrate the claims under the Uniform Arbitration Act. The agreement provides that the written decision of the two arbitration judges "shall be binding upon the sides." (3) The arbitration panel heard sworn testimony from approximately thirty witnesses in seventeen days of hearings held over several months, from February to June 1999. On August 30, 1999, the panel issued its decision. Among other things, the panel found that senior police officers had engaged in "intentional, oppressive and harmful acts" against appellees, that Chief Martinez "knew or should have known" of the senior officers' misconduct, and that by "fail[ing] to stop" the officers' abuse of their authority, Chief Martinez sanctioned the misconduct. The arbitration award also (1) awarded monetary damages to appellees, (4) (2) awarded appellees $20,000.00 in attorneys' fees, and (3) ordered the removal of certain written reprimands or charges from appellees' personnel files.

On September 14, 1999, the City filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the arbitration panel had exceeded its authority under the CBA and chapter 143 of the local government code. (5) Appellees answered and filed a counter-claim, seeking confirmation of the arbitration award. On November 20, 2000, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the City, as the losing party seeking to vacate the arbitration award, had the burden to bring forth a complete record that would warrant vacating the award, and noting that it is undisputed that no complete record of the arbitration proceedings exists. On March 11, 2004, the City filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority under the CBA and chapter 143 of the local government code. The parties filed several supplemental answers and responses. On May 25, 2004, the trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and affirmed the arbitration award. The May 25, 2004 order did not address the City's claims or the issues of attorneys' fees and interest. On December 13, 2005, the trial court issued an order, in which it (1) took notice that appellees had established attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $47,652.77, and (2) awarded appellees attorneys' fees in the amount of $40,000 (plus attorneys' fees in the event of appeal), plus pre- and post-judgment interest. This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Where a party appeals a grant of summary judgment in a suit to vacate an arbitration award, we review the district court's ruling de novo. (6) As "long as the arbitrator's decision draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator is not fashioning his own brand of industrial justice," we will decline to vacate the award. (7) In applying the "essence" test, an arbitration award "must have a basis that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the letter or purpose of the collective bargaining agreement. . . . The award must, in some logical way, be derived from the wording or purpose of the contract." (8)

Although we accord an arbitrator's decision considerable deference regarding the merits of the controversy, the CBA circumscribes his jurisdiction. (9) An arbitrator may look beyond the written contract when interpreting a collective bargaining agreement if the instrument is ambiguous or silent upon a precise question. (10) Where the arbitrator exceeds the express limitations of his contractual mandate, judicial deference ends and vacatur or modification of the award is an appropriate remedy. (11)

Jurisdiction

Initially, we address appellees' "motion to determine jurisdiction," in which they seek dismissal of the City's appeal, contending that: (1) the trial court's May 25, 2005 order disposes of all parties and issues and is therefore a final order, (2) the December 13, 2005 order is a nullity because the court's plenary power had expired, and (3) therefore, the City's filing of its notice of appeal was untimely. The City argues that the May 25, 2005 order "addressed the merits of the case but did not resolve the issue of attorneys['] fees and interest," and that the December 13, 2005 order "disposed of all issues as to all parties" and became the court's final judgment, from which the City timely appealed.

A judgment is not final unless it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record. (12) There can be no presumption that a motion for summary judgment addresses all of the movant's claims. (13) In cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if it either states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment or actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language. (14) The law does not require that a final judgment be in any particular form. (15) Therefore, whether a summary-judgment order is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case. (16)

Here, the May 25, 2005 order, entitled "Judgment Confirming Award," (1) states that appellees "are entitled to Summary Judgment and a judgment confirming the award of the arbitrator," and (2) orders that appellees "have judgment as specified in the Arbitrator's Order of August 30, 1999." It neither addresses the City's request for declaratory relief and attorneys' fees, nor does it contain a "Mother Hubbard" clause, stating that "all relief not expressly granted is denied."

The December 13, 2005 order, entitled "Order Granting Defendants' Attorney's Fees and Interest on Judgment," (1) notes that both the City and appellees sought attorneys' fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act, (17) and (2) awards appellees attorneys' fees (including attorneys' fees on appeal) and pre- and post-judgment interest. The order further states that "[a]ll writs and processes for the enforcement and collection of this judgment or the costs of court may issue as necessary" and "[a]ll further relief not expressly granted in this judgment is hereby DENIED." We conclude that because the May 25, 2005 order did not dispose of the City's claims for declaratory judgment or attorneys' fees, it was not a final appealable order. In addition, although we recognize that a "Mother Hubbard" clause alone does not indicate that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final, (18) we nonetheless conclude that based on the language of the order and the record in this case, the December 13, 2005 order is a final, appealable order. Accordingly, we hold the City's notice of appeal was timely filed.

Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment

In its first issue, the City complains the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award because the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority under the CBA. Article I of the CBA states that the purpose of the agreement is "to provide for an equitable and orderly process that addresses salaries, working conditions, and employee-employer working relations that may arise" during the term of the agreement. Article XXII, section 7 of the CBA provides, in pertinent part, "[n]o police officer shall be discriminated against in any way because of activity on behalf of the Union." Article XXVII, entitled "Grievance Procedures," provides for arbitration of grievances. Subparagraph (2) of this section provides:

The hearing on the grievance shall be informal and the rules of evidence shall not apply. The Arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, subtract from, to modify, the provisions of this agreement in arriving at a decision on the issue or issues presented; and shall confine his decision solely to the precise issue or issues submitted for arbitration, and shall have no authority to determine any other issues not directly presented in the grievance. The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the grievant and the City.

Paragraph II of the arbitration award states that from November 1997 to August 1999, appellees were "harassed, intimidated, embarrassed, cajoled, denied advancement, suspended, removed from work positions within the Police department, forced to suffer monetary damage, suffered violations of their civil rights, and were publicly humiliated" by Chief Martinez and other senior police officers. In Paragraph VI(A), in which the arbitration panel offers its "Conclusion[s]," the award states that the City, through its senior police officers, engaged in "official oppression, discrimination, and punitive retaliation" against appellees in violation of section 7 of the CBA. As noted above, section 7 of Article XXII of the CBA prohibits discrimination against officers because of Union activity. We find no other reference in the arbitration award to a specific section of the CBA. Accordingly, we conclude that the award is based on the arbitrators' conclusion that the City and its senior officers discriminated against appellees because of their Union activities.

In their motion for summary judgment, appellees contend they are entitled to judgment because as the losing party seeking to vacate the award, the City has the burden to produce a complete record establishing a basis for modifying or vacating the award, and no such record exists. Appellees note that in Article XXIV of the CBA, providing for arbitration of disciplinary actions against police officers, paragraph six of section three provides:

A stenographic transcription of the [arbitration] proceeding shall be made only upon written agreement of the parties prior to commencement of the hearing. Should there be no agreement, the party desiring the transcript may have the transcript made at its sole expense. Hearings may be recorded by audio tape by either party and a copy of the audio recording shall be made available to the other party upon request.

In support of their motion, appellees presented the following summary judgment evidence: (1) a copy of the City's Motion to Continue (in which the City admits that it has the burden to bring forth a complete record of the proceedings giving rise to the adverse award); (2) affidavits of the arbitrators, appellees' counsel, and one of the appellees, all of which state that no complete record of the arbitration proceedings exists; and (3) a copy of the CBA. In support of its argument, appellees cite Eurocapital Group Ltd. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 17 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 790-91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (op. on motions for reh'g); and Atrium Westwood VIII Venture v. Barrick Westwood Ltd. P'ship, 693 S.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). We agree that these cases support appellees' argument that the City had the burden to bring forth a complete record establishing a basis for vacating or modifying the award. (19) Without a record, we presume that adequate evidence was presented to support the arbitrator's award. (20) The burden is on the City to establish that the arbitrators exceeded their authority; the City has not met its burden. The record before us does not include any evidence that the arbitrators exceeded their authority. We overrule the City's first issue and affirm the trial court's order confirming the arbitration award.

Attorneys' Fees

In its second issue, the City contends the trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to appellees because the CBA contains no provision authorizing the award of attorneys' fees. Appellees argue that "[w]here the CBA is silent, the arbitrator is presumed to have authority if it is necessarily implied by the authority to address the subject matter." The trial court's December 13, 2005 order granting appellees attorneys' fees notes that the City requested relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act and that appellees' request for attorneys' fees was also based on the Declaratory Judgment Act. (21) The order notes that the following cases "concerning the Declaratory Judgment Act" support appellees' request for attorneys' fees: Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1995); Farnsworth v. Deaver, 147 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.); Agan v. Comm'rs Court of Titus Co., 922 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 940 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1997); City of El Paso v. Crum Const. Co., 864 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied); and Knighton v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

Although the cases cited in the trial court's December 13, 2005 order "concern" the Declaratory Judgment Act, the only case that involves arbitration is City of El Paso, and it is inapposite. (22) This Court has held that there is "no basis for recovery of attorneys' fees in a successful defense against an action to vacate an arbitration award." (23) In Int'l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville, we also rejected the argument (apparently relied on by the trial court in this case) that a party is entitled to attorneys' fees because it sought a declaratory judgment from the trial court. (24) Because we conclude the trial court erred in awarding appellees attorneys' fees, we sustain the City's second issue. (25)

Conclusion

We modify the trial court's judgment to delete the trial court's award of $40,000.00 in additional attorneys' fees for enforcing the arbitration award, plus the additional attorneys' fees for appealing to this Court, and for potentially appealing to the supreme court. (26) As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment confirming the arbitration award.

LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed

this the 27th day of September, 2007.

1. Appellees are police officers (or former officers) for the City of Weslaco. At the time of the arbitration, they were members of the Weslaco Municipal Police Union ("the Union"), then the bargaining agent for Weslaco police officers.

2. The applicable CBA was in effect from October 1, 1997, through September 30, 1999.

3. Emphasis in original.

4. The arbitration panel awarded monetary damages to appellees in the following amounts: (1) $10,170 to Baudelio Castillo, (2) $4,000 to Adan Sanchez, (3) $2,500 to Jose Angel Rodriguez, (4) $2,500 to David Gamez, and (5) $4,000 to "Bruce" [Brent] Kennedy.

5. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 143.001-.363 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2006).

6. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 66, 71 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1995).

7.
Id. at 182 (quoting Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1989)).

8. Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1325 (5th Cir.1994) (citation omitted).

9.
Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v., 889 F.2d 599 at 602.

10.
Id.

11.
Id.

12.
Cartwright v. Cologne Prod. Co., 182 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) (citing Guajardo v. Conwell, 46 S.W.3d 862, 863-64 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); Garcia v. Comm'rs Court, 101 S.W.3d 778, 784 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)).

13. Id. (citing McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)).

14. Id. (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. 2001); Garcia, 101 S.W.3d at 784).

15. Id.
(citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195; Garcia, 101 S.W.3d at 784).

16. Id.
(citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195; Garcia, 101 S.W.3d at 784).

17.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997).

18.
See First Nat'l Bank v. DeVillagomez, 54 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).

19. See GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Raus, 126 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied); Anzilotti v. Gene D. Liggin, Inc., 899 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.).

20. Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 267; Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that without a transcription of the arbitration proceedings, we must presume adequate evidence to support the award); House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same).

21.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997) (providing that a court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees in proceeding under Declaratory Judgment Act).

22. The court in City of El Paso held that municipal corporations may be held liable for attorneys' fees in declaratory judgment actions. City of El Paso v. Croom Const. Co., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).

23. Int'l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. Int'l Energy Dev. Corp., 981 S.W.2d 38, 54 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) (rejecting trial court's award of additional attorneys' fees in arbitration award under the FAA); see also Perry Homes v. Cull, 173 S.W.3d 565, 574 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth- 2005, pet. granted) (noting a trial court may not add post-arbitration attorneys' fees to the arbitration award); Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d 422, 436 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (noting, in reviewing arbitration award under TAA, that "If an arbitration award includes an award of attorneys' fees, a trial court may not award additional attorney fees for enforcing or appealing the confirmation of the award, unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise."); Cooper v. Bushong, 10 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied) (noting, in challenge to arbitrator's decision pursuant to the TAA, that absent evidence to support modification of arbitrator's award, a court must confirm the award).

24. See Int'l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville, 981 S.W.2d at 54.

25. We note that although the arbitration award is silent as to pre- and post-judgment interest and costs, appellees' pleadings include a request for the award of interest and costs. The trial court's December 13, 2005 order awards pre- and post-judgment interest to appellees and adjudges all costs against the City. The City does not challenge the trial court's award of interests and costs, and accordingly, those elements of the trial court's judgment remain intact.

26. See Crossmark, 124 S.W.3d at 437.

Hector P Garcia Institute of Education, Integrity, Culture and Public Policy: Corpus Christi Watchdog Authority: Fwd: [Bay of Pigs] Judge Westergren h

2007-08-01T01:04:00.000-07:00

Actionable?

Well dont just stand there!!

Get To Work!!!

Hector P Garcia Institute of Education, Integrity, Culture and Public Policy: Corpus Christi Watchdog Authority: Judge Westergren has been given the opportunity to produce the ...

The Serpent IN the Garden January 14, 1996 Houston: Inaction Allowed Abuser To Roam For 10 Years.

2007-07-18T02:48:00.000-07:00

If this was leaked to the media did the Corpus Christi Caller Times tell us about this pedophile?

Did the Caller publish any stories on this matter?

And the CCISD Board did they inform the community?

The Serpent IN the Garden January 14, 1996 Houston: CCISD board President Henry Nuss AQUIESCED. CCISD eagerly supplied pedophile with young patients - even after he had been publicly charged.

CORPUS CHRISTI - James Plaisted was a respected child psychologist, a deacon in one of the city's largest Baptist congregations and the father of four.

He also was a child molester so brazen he escorted little girls into church and fondled them under his coat while listening to the sermon.

Parents knew. So did church pastors, school officials and state regulators. But few did anything to stop him, and those who tried were remarkably unsuccessful.

It took 10 years to get Plaisted behind bars. Only he knows how many children he molested during that time.

Last month, Plaisted - already serving a two-year federal prison term for luring a Texas patient to Boston to continue molesting her -was brought back to Corpus Christi in chains.

He pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting four girls and was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

State regulators have yet to revoke his license to practice psychology.

""I think the Plaisted case is the model of what happens when the system fights with itself," said Susan Snyder, a Kingsville attorney and former prosecutor who tried to lock up Plaisted in 1992.

""Obviously, there have been safeguards in place to prevent this man all along, but either (state officials) were too lazy or too busy, or too scared of the politics of going and yanking this man's license," Snyder said. ""It's not the legal system failing. It's the people within the legal system that refuse to let the legal system work."

It's not as if no one tried.

Carmen Alvarado, the mother of the first child to accuse Plaisted more than 10 years ago, sought criminal charges against the therapist and filed an ethics complaint with the Texas Board of Examiners of Psychologists. She alleged that Plaisted had fondled her son's penis during a late-night counseling session.

Alvarado called the Parkdale Baptist Church, where Plaisted, 46, was a deacon.

""They said they were leaving it in God's hands," she recalled.

""I don't think they were thinking straight at the time."

She went to other parents. She got no help.

In the end, it was just her son's word against Plaisted, who told a Corpus Christi jury in 1986 that the 6-year-old child was a habitual liar and a pyromaniac who derived sexual excitement from setting fires. It didn't help that a new prosecutor was assigned to the case just before trial.

The jury acquitted Plaisted; his practice continued.

""It made me mad because when I went for help, all I asked was for them to testify," Alvarado recalled. ""We lost because my son was the only witness we had."

""It was a very tough call to make," said another victim's mother. ""And looking back, I really should have crucified him, but I didn't. I chose not to after talking to my attorney. He told me it would just really traumatize my daughter."

The Corpus Christi woman, who asked not to be identified, said she did confront Plaisted and his wife, who were neighbors in 1984, when her daughter was allegedly molested while spending the night with one of Plaisted's daughters.

""He did not deny it," she said. ""He said he could have done it

in his sleep."

Plaisted's wife laughingly added that she and her husband often made love at night, and he would not remember the next morning, the woman said.

The woman, who was also a member of the Parkdale Baptist Church, recalled telling church officials later about Plaisted's molestations.

""But it didn't seem to make any difference," she said. ""The church really backed him up, and a lot of people left the church after that."

Plaisted's attorney, Doug Tinker, refused to allow the Chronicle to interview his client. The criminal defense lawyer, who earlier this year represented Yolanda Saldivar, who was convicted of murdering Tejano star Selena, declined to discuss the Plaisted case.

The victims' families have since sued the church for negligence, but Parkdale's lawyer argues the congregation should not be held responsible for Plaisted's actions.

""It would be the church's wish to get this thing resolved without causing any additional hurt to anyone," said attorney Van Huseman. But he added, ""If a child gets molested in the middle of the service, how does that get to be the pastor's fault?"

Plaisted - a Nebraska native who served in the Army in Vietnam -came to Corpus Christi in 1982 with impeccable credentials, having earned his doctorate in clinical and child psychology from Auburn University in Alabama in 1981.

He quickly built a private practice, and over the years, developed a good reputation as an expert on brain dysfunction.

The Corpus Christi school district, along with local pediatricians, eagerly supplied him with young patients - even after he had been publicly charged. Members of the church also sought his help, and he had hospital privileges at the prestigious Driscoll Children's Hospital, a South Texas institution known both for quality care and charity.

Neighbors described Plaisted as pleasant, reserved, well-spoken. He was methodical, they said, and liked to work on projects around the house.

Plaisted recruited some of his victims from broken homes, showering the children with gifts, inviting them and their parents to Thanksgiving dinners. One 9-year-old girl who spent the night with Plaisted's daughter told prosecutors the psychologist molested her on the sofa in his living room while he and the children watched the movie "Home Alone"

on video.

He curried favor with his victims' parents by lending them money and refusing repayment, or by buying them air conditioners and other gifts. One mother even acted as a character witness for the therapist during the Alvarado trial, unaware that her own child was being molested.

""The bottom line is this guy had complaints filed against him at the psychology board - and they are serious - and the board doesn't notify the school about the complaints," said Jerry Boswell, director of the Citizens Commission on Human Rights, a group funded by the Church of Scientology (SEE CORRECTION) that documents cases such as Plaisted's. ""And the school is still referring children to this guy."

Corpus Christi school administrators said they used Plaisted infrequently for psychological testing of students, although school records and correspondence indicate he was a consultant from 1983 until he was indicted for child sexual assault in late 1992.

School administrators have identified records of five students referred to him for psychological testing between 1985 and 1992. There are no records prior to 1985.

School board President Henry Nuss, who has served on the board for seven years, said he first heard of the Plaisted case when he was contacted by the Houston Chronicle last week.

""We certainly should be more selective in who we're using," he said.

After Plaisted was charged in the Alvarado case in April 1986, Robert J. Garcia, the school district's special education director, wrote to the state psychology board to ask about the psychologist's record. The agency's executive director replied that Plaisted's license had been suspended, but because the psychologist was in the process of suing to get it back, he remained licensed to practice. The letter gave no details about the nature of the complaints.

""He was given a clean bill of health by the only agency that had anything to say about it," said Dr. Adrian Haston, a psychologist who coordinates the school district's psychological services, and who, years ago, shared an office with Plaisted.

Haston emphasized that none of the schoolchildren referred to Plaisted were molested. ""And we never had anything untoward, any problems of that sort," he said.

Asked why the district would risk using a psychologist once accused of being a child molester, Haston replied, ""This is something the district did, and you can ask the director of special education why."

Garcia said in a recent telephone interview that he could not remember whether he knew about the child molestation charges at the time he wrote to the psychology board.

""All I know is we asked for what his status was and they said he could still practice," he said. ""We knew he was under review, but we didn't know what for.

""Look, the state board of psychologists, they're the ones that allowed him to continue to practice," Garcia added angrily.

""If anyone should be asked as to why this guy was allowed to continue, it should be the state board of psychology."

Pressed for further details, Garcia abruptly ended the interview and hung up the phone.

Although Plaisted was acquitted in August 1986 in the Alvarado case, the psychology board continued its investigation and ruled in November of that year that Plaisted had violated professional standards.

The board officially suspended his license for two years, but said he would be allowed to resume his practice in three months.

Meanwhile, Plaisted challenged the suspension in state district court in Austin, arguing the psychology board had unfairly considered allegations that had not been introduced during his hearing, denying him the opportunity to defend himself against them. The judge agreed, and in January 1987 reversed Plaisted's suspension.

While the board was investigating Plaisted's case, they were contacted by Corpus Christi psychologist George Kramer.

Kramer, who had hired Plaisted in 1982 before Plaisted was licensed, told the board to subpoena records of the state Department of Human Resources. It did, and found other instances of alleged molestation by Plaisted.

In April 1989, the board reached an agreement with the psychologist that allowed him to keep his license if he agreed to be supervised for 11/2years. Plaisted was to treat children only in the presence of an associate or in a location where he could be observed by a television monitor. He also was to pay to have Corpus Christi psychologist Joseph Horvat supervise his casework.

Horvat met with Plaisted weekly, but after a year - convinced that Plaisted was doing nothing wrong - he recommended the supervision be terminated six months early. The board decided to continue the supervision.

""I have found no evidence in any way, shape or form of any behavior on his part which could be in any way construed as unprofessional or unethical," Horvat wrote to the board.

Included in one of his reports to the board was a review of Plaisted's treatment of an 8-year-old girl - a child Plaisted was later charged with molesting.

The board's general counsel, Barbara Holthaus, acknowledged past actions taken by the agency were inadequate.

""With hindsight, of course it wasn't appropriate, because look at what happened," Holthaus said. But she said the board has since added lay people to its ranks and has a new, tougher state law giving it better enforcement powers.

""Now, if we get a report that a psychologist is molesting a client, we can go before a judge and say we want to temporarily suspend the license," she said.

Holthaus said the board has filed a motion to revoke Plaisted's license, but Plaisted is fighting it.

""It's all kind of moot, because he's incarcerated," she said.

Soon after Plaisted completed his board-ordered supervision, Corpus Christi police received new information from state child welfare workers that Plaisted had been molesting girls at his office, in church and at home in his hot tub.

Former detective Eric Michalak, who now works in Colorado, remembered taking the Plaisted case to a Nueces County assistant district attorney for prosecution.

""He wanted to get a warrant for the doctor and arrest him, because we had very strong evidence against him," Michalak said. ""We had multiple victims and you had a guy in the position he was in, where he had access to all these victims.

You would want to take quick action rather than let it go on for so long."

The prosecutor was overruled by then-District Attorney Grant Jones, Michalak said. ""(Jones) just said, `We're not getting a warrant. We're taking our time.' He wanted the kids reinterviewed by one of the prosecutors.

""Any time you go after someone like that, there's a lot of politics that come into play," Michalak added. ""Instead of stepping in right then, and bringing it out in the open and taking it to a grand jury (for indictment), they delayed."

Jones contends that any delay in prosecution was an effort ""to tie the case down tight. We didn't want to lose him twice,"

said Jones, on whose watch Plaisted was acquitted in the Alvarado case.

Jones called it ""outrageous" the psychology board still hasn't revoked Plaisted's license.

""They should have done it in 1986," he said. ""What they want to do is wait around until you go to trial and you convict him, and then they come in behind your conviction and revoke his license. Well, what's he doing in the meantime? He could be out in the community molesting kids for two years."

Michalak said the case was finally taken to the grand jury several months later after he leaked the information about Plaisted's investigation to the local media.

""It was taking too long, and it wasn't being handled like another case," he said. ""And it was because he was so prominent in the community."

Plaisted was finally indicted in Corpus Christi in October 1992. He posted bond, closed his practice in Corpus Christi, and negotiated an agreement with the psychology board to place his license on inactive status until he could prove his innocence.

He then moved to Boston, where he enrolled in Boston University Law School and successfully completed his first year of studies by May 1994.

While in law school, Plaisted began calling a former patient - the girl whose treatment Horvat had reviewed in Corpus Christi. Plaisted convinced the girl's mother - who was also a patient of his - to bring the girl to Boston for additional therapy.

Plaisted's plans were foiled when a policeman setting up a speed trap in his neighborhood accidentally intercepted on his police radio a sexually explicit telephone call between the girl and Plaisted, who was using a cordless phone.

FBI agents were called in, six other calls were taped, and Plaisted was arrested on June 3, 1994, after he met the girl, then 13, and her mother at the train station and took them to a budget motel.

""The mother wasn't aware" of the molestations, said Adolfo Aguilo, an assistant Nueces County district attorney. ""The mother had a borderline personality disorder - she developed dependency on people -and unfortunately for her the person she developed a dependency on was Dr. Plaisted."

Sgt. Michael Harpster, a police detective from suburban Boston who helped arrest Plaisted, described him as ""very congenial, almost shy."

""He'd answer questions very courteously, but he didn't show any outward signs of knowing the seriousness of the situation," Harpster said.

Last January, Plaisted was sentenced by a federal judge in Boston to a two-year prison term after he pleaded guilty to transporting a minor across state lines to engage in illegal sexual activity.

The Corpus Christi conviction and sentence came almost a year later.

In the end, Plaisted admitted molesting four victims. But prosecutors say no one will ever know how many others failed to come forward.

""I imagine there could be several other victims. Through his practice and the church he probably had access over the years to thousands of children," said Aguilo, the Corpus Christi prosecutor who eventually secured Plaisted's guilty plea.

""To me, any kid that came in contact with this guy was a victim in some way or another," added Michalak.

When Plaisted was sentenced last month, it was a bitter emotional meeting for many of his young victims and their parents, who had been called as witnesses in case Plaisted decided against the plea bargain.

Parents said Plaisted stood up straight, held his head high and looked the judge in the eye. And when he saw the relatives of his former victims, he acted as if he were attending a reunion of old friends, they said. One parent said Plaisted looked as if he thought they were there as supporters or character witnesses.

""He turned around and gave the families a big smile," Alvarado said. ""I couldn't believe it."

Alvarado, who sued Plaisted in civil court, has received a settlement for an undisclosed amount. Her son, now a teen-ager, is still struggling with his past abuse, she said, and she continues to feel betrayed by those who would not join her in speaking out years ago.

""I told them if they had helped me in the beginning, none of this would have happened," she said.

Plaisted timeline

Key dates in the career of Dr. James R. Plaisted:

January 1983: Licensed to practice psychology in Texas.

October 1984: Investigated by Texas Department of Human Resources for allegedly molesting a neighbor's child.

April 1986: Charged in criminal case for allegedly fondling a boy during therapy.

August 1986: Acquitted by jury in Corpus Christi.

October 1992: Indicted for sexual abuse of three Corpus Christi girls.

December 1992: Closed Corpus Christi office; moved to Boston to begin law school.

June 1994: Arrested by FBI agents for luring a 13-year-old former Corpus Christi patient to Boston.

January 1995: Indicted by Corpus Christi grand jury on three counts of aggravated sexual assault for incidents years earlier involving the same girl.

January 1995: Sentenced to two years in federal prison in Boston case.

Dec. 7, 1995: Sentenced to 40 years in state prison by a Corpus Christi judge after pleading guilty to five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child.

South Texas Judicial Watch Dog Authority: Dear Officers of the Court, submitted for further investigation

2007-05-22T00:28:00.000-07:00

South Texas Judicial Watch Dog Authority: Dear Officers of the Court, submitted for further investigation

In Re: State v Villa

Do a little research on Del Mar College's in house counsel, Sean Meredeth, DMC Auditorium, Ballet Nacional, little girls, Joe Alaniz, and the relationship with our DA

Why is this evidence not included in the current prosecution of Villa?

Why not drag the whole bunch down to the Courthouse?

Friends of the Prosecution or not, enough of the selective prosecutions. Plaisted, Applebee, and the one's who covered it up at Parkdale Baptist & St Joseph's here in the Jurisdiction of the Nueces County / 105th District Attorney. Zealously

Possible Brady Material?

Does this material not merit a Grand Jury Investigation?

Pervert in Auditorium

"IN THE KNOW": Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University.

2007-05-07T03:59:00.000-07:00

"IN THE KNOW": Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University.

Subject: ["IN THE KNOW"] Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law...
To: kenedenonews@gmail.com

[ http://storkclub-winchell.blogspot.com/2007/05/irma-rangel-legacy-relating-to.html]
http://www.ibcmemorial.org/irma.html

Monday, May 7, 2007
Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga | Henry Cuellar | Edwards, Al | Todd Hunter | Luci0 : The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University.

Or posture for another agenda?

Who at that time wanted a Pharmacy College?

Celanese, King Ranch, URI?

Now we have this unorthodox legislation for an Engineering School @ TAMUCC?

This is a Developing Medical Community with the ability to become the finest in the world. Medical Nanotechnology is already here, $ are already here.

The Political Faction at TAMUCC will find their equilibrium eventually. An engineering school @ CCSU / TAMUCC is obtuse to the medical assets we have accumulated and the Philanthropy already well rooted in South Texas.

Irma Rangel Legislation was for the establishment of a law school at Texas A & I

The Age of Winchell: Irma Rangel Legacy : Relating to the establishment of a law school at Texas A&I University.

Hugo Berlanga | Henry Cuellar | Edwards, Al | Todd Hunter | Eddie Lucio

Bill:

SB 646

Legislative Session: 71(R)

Council Document: 71R 1835 MHT-D

Add to Bill List

Last Action:	02/28/1989 S Reported favorably w/o amendments

Caption Version:	Introduced
Caption Text:	Relating to the establishment of a law school at Texas A&I University.

Author:	Truan

Subjects:	Education--Higher-- General (I0231) TEXAS A&I UNIVERSITY (U2467)

Companion:	HB 1630 by Rangel, Identical

Senate Committee:	Education
Status:	Out of committee
Vote:	Ayes=9 Nays=1 Present Not Voting=0 Absent=1

--
Posted By The Advocate to Google Yourself Corpus Christi at 5/07/2007 02:46:00 AM

Kenedeno Hardcopy: A long line of Kenedeños who have worked for generations as coastal cowboys in S. TX, & the history of the legendary side-by-side K

2007-04-01T03:07:00.000-07:00

Kenedeno Hardcopy: A long line of Kenedeños who have worked for generations as coastal cowboys in S. TX, & the history of the legendary side-by-side Kenedy & King ranch

subjective "a claim of 'vindictive prosecution' presents primarily factual questions of government motive. Intent?

2006-12-13T00:21:00.000-08:00

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-1559-03

RONNIE JOE NEAL, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

RUSK COUNTY

Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keller, P.J., Meyers, Keasler, Hervey and Holcomb, JJ., joined. Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which, Price and Johnson, JJ., joined.

O P I N I O N

After a court trial, a judge found appellant guilty of possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed this conviction and ordered the case dismissed. It concluded that appellant's prosecution-which came after he filed a federal civil-rights suit-raised a presumption of vindictiveness that the State did not overcome at trial. (1) The State asks whether the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's judgment on a theory of prosecutorial vindictiveness when that theory was never properly presented to the trial court. (2) We hold that it did err when it reversed the trial court's judgment on a basis never pleaded, proved, or ruled upon in the trial court. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

During the summer of 1998, appellant was in the Rusk County jail awaiting trial on charges of forgery and burglary of a habitation. On June 16, 1998, the local jailers caught him with a homemade weapon-a toothbrush sharpened into a stabbing instrument-which he had secreted in his boxer shorts. On July 17, 1998, appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, to both the forgery and burglary charges. On September 9, 1998, he was indicted for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution, stemming from the June 16th incident. Appellant filed a federal civil-rights lawsuit against Rusk County on May 20, 2000, alleging mistreatment in the jail. Before trial in the civil-rights suit, appellant and the State negotiated a plea bargain for a two-year sentence on the pending weapons charge. Appellant-who was by then in prison serving his burglary sentence-was bench-warranted back to Rusk County for a plea on the weapons charge. But before that plea hearing could take place, Rusk County officials returned appellant to prison because they learned he was HIV positive. Thus, on November 17, 2000, the State dismissed the weapons charge with a notation that "[t]he defendant was convicted in another case."

On February 28, 2001, the federal district court conducted a one-day trial on appellant's civil rights suit. Appellant testified and admitted that he had possessed the homemade weapon in the Rusk County jail. No ruling was made on that date in the federal trial. On March 6, 2001, six days after the federal hearing, the State-at the behest of the Rusk County Sheriff's Office, which had first learned about the dismissal of the weapons charge at the civil-rights trial-re-indicted appellant on the weapons charge. (3) Appellant learned on April 18, 2001, that the federal district judge had awarded him a $6,000 judgment against Rusk County in the civil-rights suit. (4)

The State declined to re-offer its original two-year plea bargain on the weapons case. After the trial court denied his pretrial motions (none of which claimed prosecutorial vindictiveness), appellant waived a jury and requested a court trial. After hearing the State's evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty.

At the punishment hearing, the State put on evidence of: 1) appellant's previous forgery and burglary convictions; 2) appellant's penitentiary packet, which listed four other convictions-one robbery, two burglaries, and one unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; and 3) letters appellant wrote to his girlfriend while in the Rusk County jail in which he asked for her assistance in smuggling a handgun into the jail so he could escape and in obtaining documents to create a new identification after he escaped.

The defense presented evidence that, before trial on the federal civil-rights case, the State and appellant had negotiated a plea bargain for a two-year sentence, but that the State was unwilling to re-offer that bargain after the federal trial. The defense characterized the re-indictment as unfair and retaliatory and asked the trial court to assess the original agreed-to two-year sentence. Appellant's attorney, in closing, stated: "Now, this man here, I think to resolve this issue, he's in agreement, his sister's in agreement, I'm in agreement, punish him with the original two years that everybody thought was right." In its closing, the State asked the court "to review all of the evidence that was introduced today, review the seriousness of the crime, review his criminal record and issue the appropriate sentence."

The trial court assessed punishment at six years in prison.

In his brief to the court of appeals, appellant alleged, for the first time, that his conviction should be reversed and the case dismissed because it "was in violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of prosecutorial vindictiveness." He stated that "[t]he prosecutor in this case acted in bad faith and maliciously by re-indicting [him] a second time" and that "there was no other reason except for revenge and retaliation for the prosecutor to pursue a second indictment."

The court of appeals agreed and held that the sequence of events ("the State dismissed Neal's charge completely, the civil suit was heard, and then the State re-filed the same charge") raised a presumption of vindictiveness and that there was no evidence in the trial record to overcome it. (5) It reversed the trial court's judgment and dismissed the indictment.
II.

Both Texas and federal courts recognize that prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute. Thus, "[i]f the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether to prosecute and what charge to file generally rests entirely within his or her discretion." (6) Courts must presume that a criminal prosecution is undertaken in good faith and in nondiscriminatory fashion to fulfill the State's duty to bring violators to justice. (7) Nevertheless, a decision to prosecute violates due process when criminal charges are brought in retaliation for the defendant's exercise of his legal rights. (8) Thus, the Supreme Court has held that, under specific, limited circumstances, the presumption that a prosecution is undertaken in good faith gives way to either a rebuttable presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness or proof of actual vindictiveness. (9)

A constitutional claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness may be established in either of two distinct ways: 1) proof of circumstances that pose a "realistic likelihood" of such misconduct sufficient to raise a "presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness," which the State must rebut or face dismissal of the charges; (10) or 2) proof of "actual vindictiveness"- that is, direct evidence that the prosecutor's charging decision is an unjustifiable penalty resulting solely from the defendant's exercise of a protected legal right. (11)

Under the first prong, if the State pursues increased charges or an enhanced sentence after a defendant is convicted, exercises his legal right to appeal, and obtains a new trial, the Supreme Court has found a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. (12) In the very few situations in which this presumption does apply, it can be overcome by objective evidence in the record justifying the prosecutor's action. (13) The defendant must prove that he was convicted, he appealed and obtained a new trial, and that the State thereafter filed a greater charge or additional enhancements. The burden then shifts to the prosecution to come forward with an explanation for the charging increase that is unrelated to the defendant's exercise of his legal right to appeal. (14) The trial court decides the issue based upon all of the evidence, pro and con, and the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation. (15)

Under the second prong, when the presumption does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness. (16) To establish that claim, a defendant must prove, with objective evidence, that the prosecutor's charging decision was a "direct and unjustifiable penalty" that resulted "solely from the defendant's exercise of a protected legal right." (17) Under this prong, the defendant shoulders the burden of both production and persuasion, unaided by any legal presumption. (18) Once again, the trial judge decides the ultimate factual issue based upon the evidence and credibility determinations.

Under either prong, "[i]f the defendant is unable to prove actual vindictiveness or a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, a trial court need not reach the issue of government justification." (19) That is, the State may stand mute unless and until the defendant carries his burden of proof under either prong.

III.

Appellant Forfeited His Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Claim Because He Failed to Comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a).

In this case, appellant never filed a motion to dismiss or quash the indictment based on a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Even at trial, he never argued that his due-process rights had been violated by the re-indictment. As the State Prosecuting Attorney points out, the evidence that the court of appeals relied upon to find prosecutorial vindictiveness was not presented at the hearing on appellant's pretrial motions. Instead, it was presented at the sentencing hearing after he had been found guilty. Even then, appellant offered this evidence solely in mitigation of punishment, not to support a legal due-process claim requiring dismissal of the indictment. (20)

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 provides that, in general, as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show a timely, specific objection and a ruling by the trial court. "Except for complaints involving systemic (or absolute) requirements, or rights that are waivable only ... all other complaints, whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are forfeited by failure to comply with Rule 33.1(a)." (21)

In this case the trial court neither disregarded an absolute requirement (such as jurisdiction over the subject or person), nor denied appellant a waivable-only right (such as the right to counsel or a jury trial), so the only issue is whether appellant complied with Rule 33.1(a). He did not. Appellant's prosecutorial "retaliation" argument, mentioned for the first time in the punishment hearing, was neither timely nor specific. Furthermore, appellant never asked for dismissal of the indictment nor did he offer evidence to support a due-process claim. The State was never afforded an opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence, and the trial court was never asked to rule upon a legal claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

A. The claim was not timely.

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that, if a defendant seeks dismissal of an indictment as the remedy for his constitutional or statutory claim, the Rule 33.1 requirement of timeliness means that the claim generally must be raised and ruled upon before trial. (22) Under Article 28.01, a trial court must determine such "preliminary matters" at a pre-trial hearing. (23) All preliminary matters which are not raised at the pre-trial hearing, are generally considered forfeited. (24) A motion to set aside, dismiss, or quash an indictment should be made at the first opportunity, (25) and must be presented to the trial court prior to an announcement by that party that it is ready for trial. (26) This rule serves the salutary purpose "of preventing unnecessary trials and deterring the interruption of a trial on the merits for any objection relating to the institution and presentation of the charge." (27) It would make little sense to wait until after a trial is complete before complaining that the trial should never have taken place because the indictment was defective or should have been dismissed or quashed.

In this case, appellant did file a timely motion to quash the indictment based on two specific grounds: (1) an allegation of an illegal amendment to the indictment; and (2) a claim under Tex. Penal Code §12.45, which provides that "[i]f a court lawfully takes into account an admitted offense, prosecution is barred for that offense." (28) The court held a pretrial hearing, and those were the only two issues discussed and ruled upon. Appellant's counsel stated, during his closing arguments, that the State declined to re-offer its original two-year plea bargain once it had re-indicted appellant. Thus appellant had ample time and opportunity to include any pertinent legal claim of vindictiveness in his pretrial motions. Because appellant did not raise any prosecutorial vindictiveness claim at the pretrial hearing, that claim-based on events that occurred before trial and were known to appellant before trial-was untimely. (29)

B. The claim was not specific.

Nor was appellant's prosecutorial vindictiveness claim, to the degree that it was raised at punishment, specific under Rule 33.1(a). At trial, appellant never asserted that the timing of the re-indictment demonstrated either actual vindictiveness or a reasonable likelihood of misconduct sufficient to raise a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. He used the timing to argue for mitigation of punishment-to prove that he deserved no more than the two-year sentence that the State had originally offered. Appellant took the stand and testified as follows:

Q Now, when you got re-indicted, were you still willing and able to take - willing and wanting to, to take the two original years?

A Yes, sir, I was.

Q Even though you thought it was over with?

A Yes, sir.

Q But in the negotiations then, they wouldn't agree to that, would they?

A No, sir.

Q Now, are you asking the Judge today for the original two years that you agreed to back in 2000?

A Yes, sir, I am.

***

Q And after that [federal civil-rights] trial on February 28th, were you indicted for the same incident?

A Yes, sir, I was.

Q And were you surprised?

A Yes, sir because I thought it was dismissed. So the first thing I felt was this was retaliation.

Q Are you asking the Judge, in order to get this over with, - are you asking him for the two years?

A Yes, sir, I am.

Debra Neil-Terrell, appellant's sister, likewise testified she thought the re-indictment was retaliation, but that a two year sentence would be fair:

Q And why did you want to be here for the sentencing?

A Because I would like to talk to the Judge and speak to him on behalf of my brother, because I truly feel this case is not about justice. It's about revenge.

***

Q Now, are you asking the Court - what are you asking the Court to do today?

A I'm begging the Court to please give my brother the original deal.

Q Of two years?

A Of two years, yes.

Q And do you think justice will be served that way?

A Yes, I do.

Appellant never uttered the words "prosecutorial vindictiveness" at trial. He never made this due-process claim at trial nor did he request the same relief at trial-dismissal of the indictment- that he requested on appeal. (30) What he did assert at trial was that the State acted in bad faith when it refused to re-offer the two-year plea bargain that it had agreed to before it dismissed the indictment in November 2000, which was before the federal civil trial. (31) This was not sufficient to put the trial court or the State on notice that he was raising a legally-cognizable due-process claim and seeking dismissal of the indictment. Appellant's due-process vindictiveness theory on appeal bore no resemblance to the equitable plea he made at trial. His position at the punishment hearing was that any sentence over two years would be unfair. This was not sufficient to put the trial court on notice of a due-process claim.

C. The claim was not ruled on by the trial court.

Because appellant never made his due-process claim in the trial court, that court was never given the opportunity to either hear evidence or rule on it. In Zillender v. State, (32) we stated the two-fold policies of requiring specific objections at trial:

First, a specific objection is required to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection and afford him the opportunity to rule on it. Second, a specific objection is required to afford opposing counsel an opportunity to remove the objection or supply other testimony. (33)

Because a defendant must prove his prosecutorial vindictiveness claim, the importance of making that claim in the trial court is paramount. Appellant never formally offered any evidence to support this claim, and the State was never given an opportunity to offer evidence to rebut this claim. We stated in Bone v. State: (34)

Under our system of justice, the criminal defendant is entitled to an opportunity to explain himself and present evidence on his behalf. His counsel should ordinarily be accorded an opportunity to explain her actions before being condemned as unprofessional and incompetent. (35)

We should ordinarily accord the same opportunity to a prosecutor to explain his actions before a court condemns him as having violated a defendant's due-process rights with a vindictive prosecution and orders dismissal of a felony conviction. (36)

If appellant had properly raised this issue in a written pretrial motion, the State would have been on notice to introduce the federal court judgment (thus obviating a mistake of fact by the court of appeals) (37) and the prosecutor could have testified concerning any new evidence, such as appellant's letters from jail, that had come to his attention since the original dismissal of charges. The trial judge would have had an opportunity to rule upon that motion, based upon all of the evidence and by assessing the credibility of the prosecutor's explanations.

IV.

We conclude that the court of appeals violated ordinary notions of procedural default in reversing the trial court's judgment on a legal claim which was never presented in the trial court. (38) In this case, it was only on appeal that appellant analogized his situation to that in Blackledge. (39) The court of appeals agreed with his analogy:

Even though the charges are exactly the same in this case, the reasoning still applies. The sequence of events was that the State dismissed Neal's charge completely, the civil suit was heard, and then the State refiled the same charge. So in this case, Neal's position changed from being free from all charges to being subjected to a newly-filed charge-hence the "same" charge (as the original one) is "more serious" (than no charge at all). (40)

The court of appeals stated that there was no evidence in the record to overcome the presumption of vindictiveness. (41) This is not surprising because the State was never on notice of the claim, the defense never offered evidence to support that claim, the State was never given an opportunity to offer rebutting evidence, and the trial court never given an opportunity to rule upon that claim.

Because appellant never presented his prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in the trial court, he failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Cochran, J.

Delivered: November 17, 2004

Publish

1.
Neal v. State, 117 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2003).

2. We granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's two grounds for review:

1) The court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's judgment on a theory not properly presented to the trial court and upon which the trial court was given no opportunity to rule; and

2) The court of appeals erred in applying a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness to the prosecutor's pretrial decision to re-indict, where the record fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.

Because we agree with the State's first issue, we need not address the State's second ground for review, and we therefore dismiss it.

3. In a bill of exceptions, the prosecutor testified that the decision to re-indict came after the Sheriff's Office complained about the original dismissal. The Rusk County Jail Administrator also testified. He stated that after appellant admitted under oath and in open court that he was in possession of the deadly weapon, his office contacted the district attorney's office about re-indicting appellant.

4. The court of appeals mistakenly believed that the weapons charge "was not re-filed until after Neal went to trial and was awarded damages for violations of his civil rights against Rusk County."
Neal, 117 S.W.3d at 308. In fact, appellant testified that he found out he was awarded damages on April 18th. The State has attached a copy of the federal district court's written judgment to its brief in this Court. We decline to consider that attachment for the truth of its contents, but we do take notice of the fact that this document, verifying the date of the federal judgment as April 18, 2001, could have been introduced into evidence had appellant timely raised his complaint in the proper forum.

5.
Neal, 117 S.W.3d at 308-09.

6.
State v. Malone Serv. Co., 829 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1992); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[i]n our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion").

7.
Gawlik v. State, 608 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

8.
Castleberry v. State, 704 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ("[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.'") (quoting Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363).

9.
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982).

10.
United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1999).

11.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380-81. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7(c) (1999) (discussing historical evolution of constitutional "prosecutorial vindictiveness" claims). The Supreme Court made clear that it would be quite difficult for a defendant to meet the high burden of demonstrating actual vindictiveness. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 n.19 (quoting government's brief that "the defendant is free to tender evidence to the court to support a claim that enhanced charges are a direct and unjustifiable penalty for the exercise of a procedural right. Of course, only in a rare case would a defendant be able to overcome the presumptive validity of the prosecutor's actions through such a demonstration").

12.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). In Goodwin, the Supreme Court explained why the presumption of vindictiveness prong rarely-if ever-applied outside the context of prior conviction, successful appeal, and post-appeal enhanced charging decision:

There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he simply may come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance. At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized. In contrast, once a trial begins-and certainly by the time a conviction has been obtained-it is much more likely that the State has discovered and assessed all of the information against an accused and has made a determination, on the basis of that information, of the extent to which he should be prosecuted. Thus, a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381.

13.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 375; see also United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1220 (3rd Cir. 1993)("[e]ven if a defendant establishes a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, however, the government still has an opportunity to proffer legitimate, objective reasons for its conduct").

14.
United States v. Krezdorn, 693 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that when presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness applies, "the district court may consider any reasonable explanation for the added charges, so long as the explanation tends to negate an inference of retaliatory motivation").

15.
Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 91 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[a] district court's factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness are reviewed for clear error and the legal principles which guide the district court are reviewed de novo").

16.
Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986).

17.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 & n.19; see also United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1479 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[t]o prove actual vindictiveness, there must be objective evidence that a prosecutor acted in order to punish the defendant for standing on his legal rights").

18.
United States v. Sarracino, 340 F.3d 1148, 1177-79 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[i]n reviewing a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim, 'the court must examine the prosecutor's actions in the context of the entire proceedings.' The defendant must prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence; and, '[i]f any objective event or combination of events ... should indicate to a reasonable minded defendant that the prosecutor's decision to increase the severity of charges was motivated by some purpose other than a vindictive desire to deter or punish appeals, no presumption of vindictiveness is created'") (citations omitted).

19.
United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1997).

20. The dissent argues that this Court does not address the claim that appellant actually raised in the trial court. That is, to some extent, true. The claim that appellant brought in the trial court was his closing argument equitable plea that
the trial judge should not impose any greater sentence than the two-year plea bargain that the prosecutor had once agreed to. That is not a legal claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Neither appellant nor the dissent cite any precedent that a plea-bargain offer that is once made, but later retracted, may form the basis of a legal claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness. It is largely for this reason that we have set out the two possible legal bases for a constitutional claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness in Part II.

This Court can address only the decision by the court of appeals, see Tex. R. App. P. 66.1, and that court ordered dismissal of the indictment on a legal claim that was not raised in the trial court.

21.
Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

22.
See 43A George E. Dix and Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 42.78, at 274 (2d ed. 2001).

23. Under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.01 preliminary matters include:

(1) Arraignment of the defendant, if such be necessary; and appointment of counsel to represent the defendant, if such be necessary; (2) Pleadings of the defendant; (3) Special pleas, if any; (4) Exceptions to the form or substance of the indictment or information ....

24. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.01, § 2, provides that "[w]hen a criminal case is set for such pre-trial hearing, any such preliminary matters not raised or filed seven days before the hearing will not thereafter be allowed to be raised or filed, except by permission of the court for good cause shown; provided that the defendant shall have sufficient notice of such hearing to allow him not less than 10 days in which to raise or file such preliminary matters. The record made at such pre-trial hearing, the rulings of the court and the exceptions and objections thereto shall become a part of the trial record of the case upon its merits."

25.
Valadez v. State, 408 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).

26.
Wilson v. State, 398 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (op. on reh'g).

27.
Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1969).

28. Appellant claimed that, because the State checked the box "convicted on other charges" on the dismissal form when it originally dismissed the weapons indictment, the trial court must have taken this indictment into account in accepting the plea bargain in the forgery and burglary charges. The trial court rejected this claim because appellant pleaded guilty to those crimes before he was ever indicted for the deadly-weapon offense and there was no evidence that the trial court had taken this uncharged offense into account in accepting the plea bargain on the forgery and burglary charges.

29.
See United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[b]ecause Peterson failed to raise a claim of vindictive prosecution prior to trial, the claim is waived and we review for plain error"); Jarrett v. United States, 822 F.2d 1438, 1442 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 12(b) requires that motions for selective and vindictive prosecution must be brought prior to trial or they will be deemed waived"); United States v. Conkins, 9 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993) ("a claim of 'vindictive prosecution' presents primarily factual questions of government motive. However, Sandvig did not raise this issue below, and therefore there is no evidence in the record to support his contention. Therefore, this issue does not present any of the exceptional circumstances that warrant a departure from our rule barring consideration of an issue raised for the first time on appeal").

30. The dissent notes that appellant did request, as alternative relief, that the court of appeals remand the case for a new trial or enforcement of the State's original plea offer, but that alternative relief is nonetheless based upon a legal claim that was never presented to the trial court.

31. In his closing statement, appellant's attorney argued for a two-year sentence, not dismissal of the indictment:

Now, you know, you try- the law is supposed to do justice. The law is supposed to be equal to all. What each one of us interpret as justice makes the difference on what different people get. At one time, me and the Prosecutor in this case were on the same line with Ronnie Joe Neal as to what justice was in this case, and that was two years in the state penitentiary. That's what we all thought justice would be served in this case.

But for some reason, it was dismissed, just up and dismissed by the District Attorney, who undoubtedly thought at that time even two years was too much justice, so they just dismissed. And I think there's been testimony as to why it was dismissed is because the night before the plea, the Sheriff's Office found out he had AIDS, and they took him back and didn't want to bring him back to Rusk County. But then when the federal lawsuit is heard, all at once justice should be 2 to 20 years. Not 2 years, but anywhere between 2 and 20 years.

That is not justice. That is punishing a man for filing suit on violation of his civil rights and not punishing for any criminal things he had done. And that ain't justice, Judge. In no sense of the word is that justice. Now, this man here, I think to resolve this issue, he's in agreement, his sister's in agreement, I'm in agreement, punish him with the original two years that everybody thought was right.

32. 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

33.
Id. at 517.

34. 77 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

35.
Id. at 836.

36.
See United States v. Amberslie, 312 F. Supp.2d 570, 571-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that when defendant provides sufficient circumstances to raise a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness sufficient to require the Government to respond with evidence of lack of animus, "[s]uch a response may normally be made, at least in the first instance, through affidavits from the relevant prosecutors, after which the burden shifts back to the defense to establish that the proffered response is pretextual or otherwise inadequate").

37. See note 4,
supra.

38.
Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("a trial court's decision will not be reversed on a theory the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule upon and upon which the non-appealing party did not have an opportunity to develop a complete factual record").

39. Even then, appellant did not articulate whether his vindictive-prosecution claim was one purportedly raising a presumption of vindictiveness or one of actual animus. Arguably, therefore, the court of appeals reversed the trial court on a theory that was never properly raised, even in the appellate court.

40.
Neal, 117 S.W.3d at 308.

41.
But see United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1992)("White violated federal and state laws in selling illegal drugs. The state's 1986 decision not to prosecute White is unrelated to the federal Government's 1991 determination that there was probable cause to believe that White had committed narcotics offenses. Even though White can show that his forfeiture claim brought his unprosecuted activities to the prosecutor's attention, this showing does not esta

Juan Garcia "Feelin the Byte". Prevarication is not an attribute S TX "Believes In"

2006-10-09T01:12:00.000-07:00

Juan is Using HD #33 AS A STEPPING STONE. ASK HIM TO COMMIT TO PUTTING THE TIME IN TO ACQUIRE THE NEEDED SENIORITY TO ACCOMPLISH GOALS FOR SOUTH TEXAS.

Mikal Watts? Who knows why the Good Government PAC gave the money and made the ads. It seems that it is hurting Juan more than helping him. maybe that is WATT Mikal intended.

IMO Juan Garcia should distance himself from the ads. But Juan is probably on the same page with the good Governnment PAC and the polarizing ads.

Payed? or what?
Posted on October 8, 2006 at 09:16:51 AM by cabalas

So jk and wife...
How much did seamen pay you guys to write and blast juan g.?
Or does you wife just like seamen?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Juan Garcia is not a Democrat. He is a Progressive.

Juan Lied From The Get Go.
Posted on October 8, 2006 at 11:17:12 AM by Jaime Kenedeno

We dont like Seamen and we dont like people who lie.

Not a choice IMO.

Juan's wife works for KFATSO. The only thing he is passionate about is the Homeowner's insurance on the island. I wonder why?

Juan should have been truthful.

You might want to ask him about intlellectual property.

Payed? Nobody pays us to write on this board. We can turn up the volume should you guys choose.

===================================

The fact that he frequents the SPTX Radio Station and Advertises in the SPTX Paper......
Posted on October 8, 2006 at 11:20:23 AM by Jaime Kenedeno

and the fact that he is a military man just do not reconconcile with each other.

Just doesnt make sense.
-------------------------------------

Re(1): The fact that he frequents the SPTX Radio Station and Advertises in the SPTX Paper......
Posted on October 8, 2006 at 06:20:29 PM by kj

What makes you so good jaime?
What have you done or could you do better than juan g.?
He works harder than you and homero.
Don't you still live at your parents house? Do you have a job other than doing homers bidding? Get real you are nothing more than a political prost.

-----------------------------------

That trash Christain Archer is Putting Out is costing Juan Garcia even on the Island.
Posted on October 8, 2006 at 11:00:33 PM by Jaime Kenedeno

Juan Garcia and Joe Hall live on the Island and their neighbors won't even vote for Juan. The military vote is second guessing due to the company of Companeros Juan is hangin with these days. Also, FYI I have my own home but it is not on the Island. Average people cant afford to live on the Island. Go run for office over there with that Menendez group. You guys dont got it and never will here in South Texas. Go do your business in San Antonio.

-----------------------------------

You are Jealous Rowland. A Kelleyized Socialista Anti American Air Brown Nosing For WATT
Posted on October 8, 2006 at 10:49:52 PM by Jaime Kenedeno

"What makes me so good?"

I can back up WATT I write. That is WATT makes me so good.

A JOB?

Do you pay my bills?

Do I ask you for anything?

My JOB Opportunities have been modified.

It is called being "BLACKBALLED".

But I never will relax and enjoy it.

Again it is your info Rowland.

Shall we blast your secrets to the world?

Why dont you got the balls to talk your crap to my face. I live at my parent's house cuz it is my house and my Father was ill. Well today he died.

And I run circles around all of these guys, i am smarter and much more prepared than you guys would ever estimate.

Political Prostitutes get paid and unlike them I enjoy WATT I do.

It aint ever gonna be about money for me like it is for the Andrades and the Rowlandos and all of you other brown nosing puds.

So you JUANA blast?

You found just the right guy.

Juan Garcia is a lying, decieving and backstabbing piece of work with a pretty face and a surfbord.

SO WATT.

Just wait and see who gets the word out now.

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT will happen 2 morrow @ the Regents Meeting with CG who LOVES TA. Also, there is an individual (per Cox

2006-10-03T00:55:00.000-07:00

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT will happen 2 morrow @ the Regents Meeting with CG who LOVES TA. Also, there is an individual (per Cox v. DMC) Who's Welfare is Threatened

Dreams of Elaborate (elastic) Policies and Shifting Sands of Due Process. How many "DUBBLE TALKS" can you find in the Paragraphs Below?

2006-10-03T00:03:00.000-07:00

The Response Article to this should be entertaining.

Mike Westergren should recuse as well. Will the Regents heed our words?

Probably not.

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT will happen 2 morrow @ the Regents Meeting with CG who LOVES TA. Also, there is an individual (per Cox v. DMC) Who's Welfare is Threatened

Welcome back my friend to the show that never ends, we are so glad you could attend....

2006-10-02T03:26:00.000-07:00

Anti "American Air" RAIDio Polluting the Body of Christ. "We Know, We're From Here"

Anti "American Air" Radio Polluting the Body of Christ & Subversive Faux Publication using Marxist tactic controlling the press & flow of information

Many of you asked how someone like Sanctus Vilitas came to power. This is the lesson that all must learn. It is survival to the free society that must be established.

Vilitas came to power by using a Marxist tactic of controlling the press and the flow of information. It works my friends. The theory is simple. Control the information, the language, and you control the masses.

Even if you dont post it you read it!

Where is the First Amendment now?

Their once thrivin venue (STX Chisme), is now deserted.

Wonder why?

"We Know, We're from here"

--
Kenedeno & Associates

Anti American Air

Without Shame?

Why did they mask themselves?

Why do they want to claim the Democratic Name?

WATT does the DINO conspire to gain

at the expense of our neighbor's pain

They were sent down from the North with a "Points of Unity" Campaign

To piggy back our "work product" and say it is their own, is that not WATT they claim?

Now we will see the Beach Blockade succeed cuz for the JOB they bought the wrong brain.

And still they will have no shame.

You will see and I already know, their word is meaningless. Their Articles are very boring and slow.

After all, "We're From Here".....

And such is life in South Texas

True to our roots ......

The People Reap WATT they Sew.

That is a promise I quote.....

"We know" posted by Jaime Kenedeño

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT the..........? Del Mar eyes tax boost to finance construction? Another Fultonian Overun? Or Fleeced by

2006-08-10T03:57:00.000-07:00

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT the..........? Del Mar eyes tax boost to finance construction? Another Fultonian Overun? Or Fleeced by Alaniz?

A 19% tax rate increase.

Those scratch offs are getting very expensive Mr Alaniz.

Nueces County Aristocrat Society: This Nueces County Jail issue is a counter balance in the ongoing tactical maneuvers

2006-06-24T17:58:00.000-07:00

Nueces County Aristocrat Society: This Nueces County Jail issue is a counter balance in the ongoing tactical maneuvers

Nueces De La Parra: Ranch museum tells epic tale of pioneering Kenedy family

2006-06-24T03:57:00.000-07:00

Nueces De La Parra: Ranch museum tells epic tale of pioneering Kenedy family

South Texas Chisme: Dangerous chisme?

2006-06-23T19:00:00.000-07:00

South Texas Chisme: Dangerous chisme?
Remember when you could look in the mirror and even if it was unfavorable to YOU or YOURS the announcement came in stentoric fashion????

South Texas Chisme: Don't Have To Get Physical To Be Someone's "Ho"

2006-06-17T19:08:00.000-07:00

South Texas Chisme: Don't Have To Get Physical To Be Someone's "Ho"

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: "We have intelligent people that know the right words to say to get attention," he said of those who have co

2006-06-15T03:45:00.000-07:00

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: "We have intelligent people that know the right words to say to get attention," he said of those who have complained.

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: Adriana will you please look into the selective release / demotions at Del Mar? Isn't the fat better cut at

2006-06-14T21:03:00.000-07:00

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: Adriana will you please look into the selective release / demotions at Del Mar? Isn't the fat better cut at the Executive Level?

Nueces De La Parra: "IN THE KNOW": The Retaliation and Harassment Continues After the Shooting

2006-06-10T22:07:00.000-07:00

Nueces De La Parra: "IN THE KNOW": The Retaliation and Harassment Continues After the Shooting

I Love My Corpus Christi: Roy Miller "Loved His Corpus Christi"!

2006-05-30T19:59:00.000-07:00

I Love My Corpus Christi: Roy Miller "Loved His Corpus Christi"!

Leadership lessons from the past
Roy Miller’s political skills, vision brought Corpus Christi into the modern era
By Mike Carlisle

Before Henry Pomeroy “Roy” Miller, became mayor of Corpus Christi in 1913, streets were made of sand, the bluff was a muddy mess, and water needed to be hauled in, said Bill Walraven, a local historian, author and journalist.

“Miller took the lead in building a water works, storm and sanitary sewer system, a garbage incinerator, installing electric lights, (building) paved streets, improving the bluff, creating a fire department, pushing for causeways, and rebuilding the city after it lay in ruins following the 1919 hurricane,” Walraven said. “He was also a leader in the fight for the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.”

In one of his biggest achievements, Miller used his leadership skills to secure Corpus Christi a deep-water port in 1922 after the city had lost a fight for such a port in 1910.
Historian Mary Jo O’Rear also has researched Roy Miller and written about Corpus Christi politics through her work to expand on an article she wrote for the January 2005 Southwestern Historical Quarterly. O’Rear taught history for more than 32 years in Corpus Christi secondary schools and six years at Del Mar College.

CorpusBeat: What brought Miller to Corpus Christi?
Mary Jo O’Rear: Robert Kle-berg, who took over King Ranch, wanted to push South Texas. The Kleberg family was funding a railroad line from St. Louis to Brownsville through South Texas. During a trip to Houston, Kleberg ran into Roy Miller ... and brought him to Corpus Christi in 1904 as a booking agent for the St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railroad. Robert Kleberg and other ranchers were selling off the pastureland to farmers. The ranchers needed someone to convince farmers they could grow great crops in South Texas, which is scrub desert. Kleberg needed someone to sell the idea to Midwesterners, Czechoslovakians, and Germans who were desperate for land.

As mayor, then newspaper editor, Roy Miller worked to secure a port of Corpus Christi. Photo courtesy of Jim Moloney.

CB: Was Miller successful?
MO: Miller was doing a marvelous job bringing in farmers who were tired of living up north, or fresh off the boat from Europe. Miller would load them up on trains called “Blackland Specials” to bring them down to South Texas and show them the land.

CB: Why did Roy Miller have such conviction about a deep-water port for the economic growth and industrial development of Corpus Christi?
MO: Many of the farmers who had come down and set up their farms around Kingsville could not get their crops to Galveston or Houston ports soon enough before spoiling. Miller was convinced a deep-water port in Corpus Christi was the solution. Rockport and Aransas Pass thought they should be the port location as well, so an intense rivalry emerged.

CB: How did Miller build support for the deep-water port in Corpus Christi?
MO: Miller re-invigorated the Corpus Christi Commercial Club, which was similar to a Chamber of Commerce. Miller brought a lot of young men into the club interested in developing the city. This is when he really began to push Corpus Christi as an economic entity. Miller realized politics was the only way economic growth was going to work successfully. Eventually the work propelled Miller onto a city commission and into city politics.

CB: How did people react to Roy Miller being in city politics?
MO: City politics came easy to Miller because he was such an outgoing person. He was full of energy and full of sincerity, but more than that he was a great speaker. He loved speaking and he wrote the same way he delivered speeches.

Miller used the word “excellent” all the time. People flocked to hear him speak. Whether he was selling a candidate, right of way on the “Blackland Special,” or even himself, whatever it was, he was a firm believer.

Miller moved straight ahead to secure the port after being elected mayor in 1913, with backing from Kleberg and local businesses. Corpus Christi had lost the fight for a port in 1910 because the Army Corps of Engneers did not consider it big enough nor developed enough. So when Miller became mayor in 1913, he began to accelerate the changes that former Mayor Clark Pease had started.

CB: Why did Miller lose his fourth mayoral bid?
MO: Miller ran for a fourth term, the term in which he expected to finally secure the port. But Walter Pope, former city attorney and state representative put his own law partner, Gordon Boone, up against Miller. The action split the city. Then, Pope revealed that Miller had taken money on the side from businesses for special favors. The allegations made it appear that Miller was taking money under the table. Miller never denied the allegation. He explained that he just used the money to finance trips to Washington. He lost the election in April 1919.

CB: What was the result of Miller losing the mayoral election?
MO: All the work ground down to a halt. All the work on the port, the federal efforts, modernization, all of it stopped. Then the hurricane of 1919 struck in September.

CB: How did the new administration respond to the storm? MO: The new mayor, Gordon Boone, set up a relief committee to recover from the storm. Boone placed himself and Miller in charge of the committee.

CB: What did Miller do?
MO: By the next day, Roy Miller had everybody in the city working together, including all the leading political opponents and adversaries. Miller was devastated to lose the election and bitter. But when “his” city, because it was still “his” city, when it was damaged so terribly, he answered the call of Gordon Boone to co-head the relief committee. Miller did a tremendous amount of work during the rehabilitation. But more than that, people discovered through the rehabilitation they could work together despite their differences.

From that point, Miller continued pulling together all of the opposing political factions. People watched Miller work with former political rivals and adversaries like State Sen. Archie Parr and State Rep.Walter Pope to push the port through the state legislature.

CB: What other ways did Miller unite the efforts for a Corpus Christi port?
MO: Miller wrote a series of essays and editorials in the Caller (where he was editor), and canvassed businesses to bring in money for the port. Miller was successful in getting the San Antonio Chamber of Commerce to support Corpus Christi, a major breakthrough because San Antonio had not supported Corpus Christi very well up until that time.

CB: When was the port secured?
MO: In 1922, President Warren Harding signed a bill designating Corpus Christi as a deep-water port, and within four years it was built. Miller was master of ceremonies when the port was dedicated. That is why Roy Miller is considered the “father” of the port. He had a devotion to Corpus Christi. He did everything he could to secure the port.

CB: How do you think people would perceive Roy Miller today?
MO: Well, it’s not fair because people back then looked at things differently. Nobody went about getting votes honestly back then. If you didn’t force people to vote your way because you owned the land they lived on, you were trying to keep people from voting because they were black, or poor or brown.

Roy Miller was a “Progressive” (a faction of the Democratic party). The Progressives wanted to limit the vote to whites only and the Old Guard Democrats like Archie Parr and Walter Pope wanted things the way they were, letting Mexican American and black voters vote as long as they voted the way you wanted them to vote. We have the advantage of looking back. We can say, “Oh, that’s bad, you are using bribery, you are using prejudice, you are using all sorts of things to get votes and that is not right.” I don’t think Miller would fare well at all today, especially if he would try things now that he did back then. Miller was not politically correct.

But, if you put all of that aside, if you look at his enthusiasm, his energy, his love, his personality, I still don’t think he would survive because people are not used to that today. I think we have people who are full of energy and enthusiasm, a passion for whatever cause they have, but we invariably try to tear them down. It is almost like we are uncomfortable with them.

Miller would have been a strong leader, but Corpus would look at him and say, “Now what have you really got going?” Leaders today would love to have Miller’s charisma and sincerity. Because even if people were not quite sure that he was totally on the up and up, they liked him.

CB: Would you describe Roy Miller as a leader who delegated well?
MO: Miller relied on people close to him like his in-laws who were doctors, especially about medical matters, such as closing down everything during the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic. He also made good choices and use of commission members. All the different areas of the city had different commissions to handle, areas like sanitation, or law enforcement. He did not feel the need to control everything.

CB: Did Roy Miller remain in Corpus Christi throughout his life?
MO: He kept his home here in Corpus. He was a leading politician behind the scenes for years, with homes in Houston and Washington, but he always made time for his home in Corpus Christi. Every time, he and his wife would return home to Corpus Christi, they would fly a Texas and American flag to let everyone know they were home and looking for guests to come over and see them.

Sergio Perez contributed to this article."!

Political Pulse

2006-05-30T02:21:00.000-07:00

Woody Guthrie was fond of telling the story of a fellow who was out walking one day. Now this person was of the sort that some might call a hobo or perhaps a bum but whom I shall call a free spirit. Now as this free spirit was walking he found a fence blocking his progress and a large sign that said "PRIVATE PROPERTY - No trespassing." But being a free spirit he ignored the sign, hopped the fence and proceeded on his way. After a while another fellow approached him at rather a fast clip displaying signs of extreme agitation. "Didn't you see that sign" he demanded. "This here is private property and there's NO TRESPASSING." "So you're saying you own this land" inquired the free spirit. "Damn right" replied the other. "Well how did you get to own it?" said the free spirit.

Nueces De La Parra: Face it Gabe Rivas, Carlos Garcia & Ben Blanco; Del Mar Female Students are not interested in YOU or your VIAGRA!

2006-05-15T14:23:00.000-07:00

Nueces De La Parra: Face it Gabe Rivas, Carlos Garcia & Ben Blanco; Del Mar Female Students are not interested in YOU or your VIAGRA!

South Texas Chisme: LULAC are you serious?

2006-05-15T01:45:00.000-07:00

South Texas Chisme: LULAC are you serious?

Nancy Vera starts to put into writing

2006-05-15T01:18:00.000-07:00

Esperanza Y Poder
e-mail to a friend print this
Contributed by: Nancy Vera on 4/28/2006

Let's talk about the plight of immigrants, the struggle of the poor, and how we can take action against atrocities and crimes against humanity. Let's talk about class struggle and let's talk about true freedom. I am appalled with the following incident about how two teens in Spring, Texas attacked a Mexican teen. I am equally as appalled that prosecutors " are considering whether to attach hate-crime charges." When racial epithets are blurted during an act of violence, it is a hate crime. These prosecutors, whether the penalty is the same with what the alleged perpetrators are already charged or not, should call it what it is. It should be noted for the record. To do otherwise is a sin against humanity and God. There is no doubt that racist video games perpetuate these heinous crimes. Where is the outrage? Reports state that the teen attackers dragged the young man from a party and into the yard and sodomized him with a plastic pipe from a patio table umbrella. They also indicate that the victim had high levels of toxins in his organs which means that the attackers may have poured bleach inside the pipe. Additionally, after they got him down, the attackers stomped his head with steel-toed boots and one official says that the attackers kicked the pipe further into him with the boots.The pipe was sharpened at one end and the attackers also tried to carve something on the young victim's chest with a knife. The attackers were also spewing racial epithets as they committed the act.May God help us all and may peace, nonviolence and social justice reign in the world, especially in the country of the free and the brave.

You should advocate for this despite the color of skin
Posted on May 15, 2006 at 04:03:11 AM

by Jaime Kenedeno
Nancy, maybe it was a hate crime however, you help the cause only less by bringing in the race card. IMO it is an attempt to appeal to a select group of people instead of all who despise this heinous act. Your credibility is diminshed as is the cause your fight for. This is a provocation attempt to build a united base for YOU to YANQUI (exploit). It is obvious YOU are in it for YOU first and then for the cause. You should advocate for this despite the color of skin. Quit using your people and let's start creating equality. Work smarter not harder.

Jorge an enthusiastic puffy horn of KFATSO

2006-03-30T01:07:00.000-08:00

Dont forget the Caller times

Jorge Rangel

the Harvard-educated L.A. City Attorney, Rocky Delgadillo, who is best known for prosecuting famed Paris Hilton and publicly admitting that he misuse

In applying the "essence" test, an arbitration award "must have a basis that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn,

Hector P Garcia Institute of Education, Integrity, Culture and Public Policy: Corpus Christi Watchdog Authority: Fwd: [Bay of Pigs] Judge Westergren h

The Serpent IN the Garden January 14, 1996 Houston: Inaction Allowed Abuser To Roam For 10 Years.

South Texas Judicial Watch Dog Authority: Dear Officers of the Court, submitted for further investigation

"IN THE KNOW": Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University.

Kenedeno Hardcopy: A long line of Kenedeños who have worked for generations as coastal cowboys in S. TX, & the history of the legendary side-by-side K

subjective ~~"a claim of 'vindictive prosecution' presents primarily factual questions of government motive. ~~Intent?

Juan Garcia "Feelin the Byte". Prevarication is not an attribute S TX "Believes In"

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT will happen 2 morrow @ the Regents Meeting with CG who LOVES TA. Also, there is an individual (per Cox

Dreams of Elaborate (elastic) Policies and Shifting Sands of Due Process. How many "DUBBLE TALKS" can you find in the Paragraphs Below?

Welcome back my friend to the show that never ends, we are so glad you could attend....

Anti "American Air" RAIDio Polluting the Body of Christ. "We Know, We're From Here"

Anti American Air

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: WATT the..........? Del Mar eyes tax boost to finance construction? Another Fultonian Overun? Or Fleeced by

Nueces County Aristocrat Society: This Nueces County Jail issue is a counter balance in the ongoing tactical maneuvers

Nueces De La Parra: Ranch museum tells epic tale of pioneering Kenedy family

South Texas Chisme: Dangerous chisme?

South Texas Chisme: Don't Have To Get Physical To Be Someone's "Ho"

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: "We have intelligent people that know the right words to say to get attention," he said of those who have co

Del Mar Electronic Anonymous Input Forum: Adriana will you please look into the selective release / demotions at Del Mar? Isn't the fat better cut at

Nueces De La Parra: "IN THE KNOW": The Retaliation and Harassment Continues After the Shooting

I Love My Corpus Christi: Roy Miller "Loved His Corpus Christi"!

Political Pulse

Nueces De La Parra: Face it Gabe Rivas, Carlos Garcia & Ben Blanco; Del Mar Female Students are not interested in YOU or your VIAGRA!

South Texas Chisme: LULAC are you serious?

Nancy Vera starts to put into writing

Jorge an enthusiastic puffy horn of KFATSO

subjective "a claim of 'vindictive prosecution' presents primarily factual questions of government motive. Intent?